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ABSTRACT
The trustworthiness of modern networked services is too im-
portant to leave to chance. We need to design these services
with specific properties in mind, and verify that the proper-
ties hold. In this paper, we argue that a compositional net-
work architecture, based on a notion of layering where each
layer is its own complete network customized for a specific
purpose, is the only plausible approach to making network
services verifiable. Realistic examples show how to use the
architecture to reason about sophisticated network properties
in a modular way. We also describe a prototype in which the
basic structures of the architectural model are implemented
in efficient P4 code for programmable data planes, then ex-
plain how this scaffolding fits into an integrated process of
specification, code generation, implementation of additional
network functions, and automated verification.
1. INTRODUCTION
Networks are an indispensable, mission-critical, and safety-
critical part of global infrastructure. Network researchers
and engineers now have a responsibility to work toward net-
works whose services and properties are verifiable. For this
reason, the last decade has seen considerable research on net-
work verification. Its success demonstrates that automated
verification applies to real networks and scales well enough
to be useful in practice [3].
The problems with current network verification are that it
is low-level and lacks modularity [15], because it is focusing
on packet delivery in physical networks, and on analysis of
their routing and forwarding. We know that the Internet has
many levels of virtual networks, and that these virtual net-
works are usually made of ad hoc tunnels, implemented by
packet rewriting and encap/decapsulation [22]. Even if an
existing network verifier can handle the packet transforma-
tions, neither the analysis nor the properties being checked
reflect any awareness of the virtual networks. So the prop-
erties of virtual networks (with their own virtual names and
topologies) cannot be verified, even though they are the net-
works that actually provide user services. And the strong
natural modularity that comes from layering of virtual net-
works is unexploited during analysis.
Naturally there are efforts to raise the level of abstrac-
tion of network verification, but this is almost impossible
when working from the bottom up. For example, researchers
have suggested getting higher-level specifications by infer-
ring them from existing artifacts. Existing artifacts, however,
are full of defects accreted over time, as features were added
and interwoven without the benefit of foreknowledge. If we
had higher-level specifications we could clean up the defects,
but no automated process is likely to extract pure intentions
from messy artifacts.
We believe it is time to learn how to build network services
that are modular and verifiable by construction. To do this,
we begin with an architectural model that is precise, realis-
tic, and formalizable, with layering and modularity as central
concepts. §2 gives a brief overview of this model, explain-
ing why its definition of layering is better than the familiar
layers in the “classic” Internet architecture. In §3 we use
an example to show how network services and their required
properties can be specified with the model, even though they
are built on virtual structures as much as physical ones. In
§4, which is arguably the most important section in the pa-
per, we discuss reasoning with the architectural model. The
vast majority of properties can be verified by analyzing one
separate module at a time, leading to major improvements
in efficiency. Properties verified with completely different
techniques can be composed to guarantee overall network
behavior.
Having established that the architectural model meets our
needs, our next task is to embody it directly in network com-
ponents. This means that the modular structures of the ar-
chitecture will be explicit in the implementation, so they can
be exploited not just for enhanced and verified services, but
also for measurement, management, and resource allocation.
To reach this goal, programmable data planes are the key en-
abler. In §5 we describe our work in progress on a prototype
implementation in the P4 language. We show how simple
optimizations make it run efficiently, i.e., consuming about
3% of compute resources on the Barefoot Tofino. We also
explain our plans to generate data- and control-plane code
from templates and/or specifications.
There are two obvious objections to this research program.
The first is that it is a clean-slate approach, and therefore too
ambitious for credibility. This is not true, simply because
the architectural model is drawn from close observation of
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Figure 1: Layers in the classic Internet architecture (left), corre-
sponding to layered networks in compositional network architecture.
today’s networks [22]. For this reason modules and compo-
nents in our architecture should interface easily with existing
network hardware and software, and can interoperate with
them in real deployments.
The second objection to this approach lies in the practical
implications of such intensive use of explicit architectural
structure and programmability in network implementations.
Especially in the short term, it may not be efficient enough
for real deployment. We have great hopes for optimizations
and the march of chip technology, but no guarantees on them.
Despite this objection, the research is worth doing, because
model-based development is the only plausible approach to
building networks whose services are verifiable in any mean-
ingful sense. Even if our prototype is never complete or effi-
cient enough to be used in production, all of the abstractions,
properties, and implementation mechanisms we discover can
be used directly by other researchers, and will find their way
into practice. To quote Sherlock Holmes, “. . . when you
have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however
improbable, must be the truth.”
The paper concludes with related work (§6) and a sum-
mary of research plans (§7). §3 through §5 present new
research, including a formal semantics for the architectural
model, based on the original ideas in [22].
2. COMPOSITIONAL NETWORK
ARCHITECTURE
Compositional network architecture is based on the ideas
that a network is a module, and that network services to-
day are provided by rich, flexible compositions of hetero-
geneous network modules. Each network/module is a mi-
crocosm of networking, with all the basic mechanisms in-
cluding a namespace, members, links, routing, forwarding,
session protocols, and directories. Networks are composed
by bridging, with the obvious meaning. They are also com-
posed by layering, which means something new and very
specific. In any network, a session is an instance of one of the
services provided by that network. One network is layered
on another network if a (virtual) link in the overlay network
is implemented by a session in the underlay network.
As a consequence, layers in the new model are bigger than
layers in the “classic” Internet architecture of [4] and [7] (see
TCP session between E and D
lter and
virus scanner
personnel
database
employee
laptop
E F D
Figure 2: An enterprise IP network with security. The dotted lines
represent paths of forwarders and links.
Figure 1). The advantage is that a bigger network/layer is
more complete, so its interface to an overlay network is the
same as the interface of an underlay network to it. In other
words, we have made networks composable like Lego bricks.
As demonstrated in [22], the compositional architecture
provides precise and comprehensive descriptions of how the
Internet works today. For example, we see multiple layered
IP networks, each with its own purpose and geographical or
logical span. Each has its own namespace and routing, ap-
propriate to its own level of abstraction. If the purpose of a
network is narrow, one or more of its parts might be vestigial,
which causes no problems.
3. NETWORK SERVICES AND PROPERTIES
In this section, we use a security-oriented example to il-
lustrate the compositional model and sketch out how higher-
level service properties can be specified. Figure 2 shows an
enterprise IP network with security features. The employee’s
laptop has an IP address E in the block reserved for the per-
sonnel department. The filter F allows only machines be-
longing to the personnel department to access the personnel
database. It also does anti-virus scanning. Because access
from E is allowed, there is now a TCP session between E
and D. Network security is intended to enforce two prop-
erties: P1: All accesses to the personnel database are TCP
sessions initiated by user machines belonging to the person-
nel department, and are free of known viruses. P2: Packet
streams traveling on the network paths cannot be read or tam-
pered with by any untrusted machine.
Even though this example is simple so far, and the enforce-
ment of P2 is not yet shown, a rigorous argument for P1
requires these lemmas: L1a: Every network path with the
personnel database as destination has a filter in it. L1b: All
packets of a TCP session go through the same filter instance,
so the filter can reconstruct the TCP byte stream to look for
viruses. L1c: Addresses in the personnel block are only put
into the source fields of packets by machines belonging to the
personnel department. L1d: Forwarders in network paths do
not alter the source or destination fields of packets (necessary
because L1a and L1c depend on these fields).
In today’s environment, employees expect to be able to
work on their laptops wherever they happen to be. So a
more complete version of the enterprise network and its im-
plementation is shown in Figure 3. This figure shows that
the enterprise network uses virtual private network (VPN)
implements
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Figure 3: The VPN implementation of the enterprise network.
technology to allow secure employee access from remote lo-
cations. The laptop is connected to two IP networks, one of
which is layered on top of the other. The leftmost pink bar
represents the laptop, and the ovals represent its members of
(interfaces to) the two IP networks. In the enterprise network
it has IP address E, while in the IP network of the coffee
shop where the employee is working, it has the short-term
IP address X . Network members E and X communicate
through the operating system of the laptop.
In this scenario, E has created a virtual link, in the enter-
prise network, directly to a VPN server. This overlay link is
implemented by an IPsec/ESP session in the underlay, con-
sisting of bridged public and private IP networks. TCP pack-
ets sent virtually on the enterprise link are actually encrypted
(headers included), encapsulated in packets of the IPsec ses-
sion, and transmitted through the underlay IP networks. The
VPN server also authenticates the employee laptop, checking
that it has the private key of enterprise identity E.
Throughout this example, for simplicity, we assume that
all middleboxes such as V , F , and W are correct and trust-
worthy in essential respects. This will enable us to focus
on the networks themselves. So authentication in V satisfies
L1c, as the VPN server is only one hop away from the laptop.
Now we consider security property P2 of the enterprise
network. Because the trustworthiness of middleboxes is as-
sumed and the necessary properties of forwarders are cov-
ered by L1a, L1b, and L1d, there is only one new lemma.
L2: All links of the enterprise network are secure, in the
sense that no untrusted machine can read the packets on a
secure link (neither header nor data), and no machine can in-
sert or alter packets on a secure link. In the figure, links to
the right of V are located in enterprise buildings and secured
physically. The virtual link between E and V is secure if
every packet received by either endpoint is the data part of a
packet received in the IPsec session between X and S. The
NAT/router alters the headers of IPsec packets, but not the
headers of encapsulated enterprise packets.
Finally, we add security property P3: machines at the edge
of the enterprise network are protected against flooding at-
tacks. This property is enforced by the access network in
Figure 3, where firewalls usually allow incoming packets to
public IP address S, but begin to filter out suspicious ones
when there is a sudden surge in traffic. Lemma L3 states:
All paths through the access network to machines of the en-
terprise network pass through a firewall.
4. MODULAR REASONING WITHIN THE
ARCHITECTURE
This section, while informal, is based on our formal se-
mantics of the compositional network architecture. It is writ-
ten in Alloy [8], which is a blend of first-order predicate logic
and relational algebra. The Alloy Analyzer verifies proper-
ties automatically for models of bounded size, making it an
excellent tool for experimentation with formal models.
4.1 Verification of forwarding
Existing tools for data-plane verification [3] take the for-
warding rules in network elements and compute from them
reachability, non-reachability, middlebox insertion, and other
important path properties. We propose to do exactly the
same thing, except that in our implementation each network
in a layered architecture has separate forwarding rules and
other tables (see §5), and each layer can be analyzed inde-
pendently. This kind of modularity is not exploited in any
current verification tools [15].
The first advantage of this approach is that a layer/network
has not only properties we need to prove, but the structure
and constraints we need to prove it. Analysis of the enter-
prise network in §3 can use the fixed naming scheme that
allocates a block of names for machines of the personnel de-
partment, regardless of the fact that the employee’s laptop
will have a different IP address in each coffee shop, and that
the source name in its packets changes from X to N as the
packets pass through the coffee shop’s NAT. Analysis of the
enterprise network can identify TCP packets and check that
they go through a filter that reconstructs TCP byte streams,
regardless of the fact that on some physical hops they look
like IPsec packets and the TCP headers are encrypted. Anal-
ysis can use as an axiom that forwarding through the en-
terprise network does not modify the user-chosen fields of
packet headers, which satisfies lemma L1d.
The second advantage of this approach is that modular-
ization makes verification more efficient. Lemmas L1a and
L3 are essentially the same property—all packets with cer-
tain destinations must pass through a security middlebox—
but they are verified in different (and simpler) networks. To
quantify the potential benefits, consider the example of [16],
in which layered separation of a policy-driven network (for-
warding to middlebox instances) from a destination-driven
network is found necessary to prevent combinatorial explo-
sion in the number of rules. With no layering, the forwarding
rules would not fit in the TCAM of forwarders. This suggests
that, in comparison to the number n of forwarding rules in a
non-modularized network, the number of rules in one layer
of a two-layer architecture might be
√
n rather than n/2.
We studied a variety of network services and properties,
and found that all of the necessary lemmas could be verified
in a single layer. About half of the properties apply directly
to the layer in which they are implemented, such as the L1
lemmas and L3 in this example. The other half apply to com-
positions of networks (next subsection).
4.2 Hierarchical reasoning over forwarding
and session properties
A one-to-one correspondence between implementing ses-
sions and implemented links allows bottom-up propagation
of properties verified within individual networks: any prop-
erty known to be true of an implementing session is also true
of the implemented link. For this reasoning to be credible,
there must be a “tight seam” between the two that does not
allow any leakage of packets in or out. This “seam” is built
into our architecture and implementation, rather than being
constantly and casually re-invented—it can be scrutinized
once with great care.
This hierarchical reasoning has an important advantage
that we have not seen in other verification work—it can prove
theorems that rely on properties of routing/forwarding and
on properties of session protocols. It can also prove theorems
that rely on the composition of completely different forms of
automated reasoning. For example, property P2 of §3 is a
property on paths through the enterprise network, including
forwarders, middleboxes, and links. We have already dis-
cussed properties of paths, forwarders, and middleboxes, but
what about the links (L2)? Links outside the walls of the en-
terprise are secure only because they are implemented by a
cryptographic session protocol, which can be verified using
pure mathematics and temporal-logic model checkers.
Note that TCP sessions in the enterprise network cannot
be encrypted because F works on plaintext. Packets on en-
terprise links are always plaintext, even if the implementing
sessions are encrypting them. This works because the ses-
sion protocol at the lower level decrypts the data before de-
livering it upward to be received on the virtual link.
In our study of a variety of network services and prop-
erties, the other half of the properties are verified in a single
underlay network, but they are verified for the benefit of over-
lays. In reasoning about the overlay networks, the properties
become assumptions about the behavior of their links.
4.3 Packet traceability
Our final example is based on a “service network” that un-
derlies multiple private customer networks, as in [24]. The
service network offers wide-area connectivity along with en-
hanced performance, reliability, security, and customized com-
munication services. Consider a customer network that must
abide by HIPAA regulations on medical-patient privacy. Even
if the service network normally examines customer packet
contents for optimization or security filtering, it cannot ex-
amine the contents of packets carrying patient records.
So the service network must distinguish normal packets
from patient records—without looking into them—and treat
the patient records differently. Our architectural model makes
this easy. In the customer network, there can be a separate
topology of virtual links used for patient records only. In
the service network, each virtual link is implemented by a
uniquely identifiable session. Session identifiers then give
the service network a reliable indicator of how each packet
should be treated.
This example illustrates how the architectural model pro-
vides perfect traceability of packets across all layers of a net-
work hierarchy. Traceability supports reasoning about many
security properties involving packet provenance. It also has
other uses; for example, it provides accountability for dy-
namic, measurable properties such as performance metrics.
5. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
The first goal for our prototype was to implement the ar-
chitectural model’s basic structures, especially layering—
which must form a “tight seam” at the interface between
networks. We can now show that this scaffolding is compre-
hensible, reusable, and efficient. Our next goal, in progress,
is to gain insight from the prototype on how the scaffolding
could work with control functions, management functions,
session protocols, and verification in an integrated approach
to network development.
5.1 Implementation of the model
In this subsection we describe the P4 code needed to im-
plement the data plane, specifically making the following
three points: (i) The implementation is completely general,
and works for any set of layered networks. (ii) The P4 code
is so regular that most of it can be generated automatically,
greatly reducing costs and risks of error. (iii) The general-
purpose code is easy to optimize, so that specific networks
can be implemented efficiently.
Figure 4 shows an example in which a service network
(from §4.3) is implementing the customer link from d to e
with a session from p2 to p4, routed through service for-
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Figure 4: Transmission of a packet from privateCustomer d to e, show-
ing all the match-action functions applied.
warder p3. (The machine hosting p3 does not host any mem-
bers of the customer network.) The source-port field of pack-
ets in the service network acts as a unique session identi-
fier for multi-packet UDP sessions, and the destination-port
field acts as a unique identifier of the customer network be-
ing served.
In unoptimized P4 code, each network performs five func-
tions, in each of which a match-action table is applied. The
Forward function applies a forwarding table to determine
whether a packet should be dropped or sent on a specified
outgoing link. Send/Receive applies when a network mem-
ber sends/receives, respectively, a packet in a session. Trans-
mit/Acquire applies when a network member sends/receives
a packet on a link. All forwarding in the service network is
based on session identifiers. Figure 4 shows the functions
and match-action table entries applied as a packet in a cus-
tomer network is transmitted on a link from d to e.
In Step 1, d transmits a packet on the link with local iden-
tifier 4. A Transmit table uses the link identifier as key, and
lookup results in either the literal Primitive (see Step 4) or
in an external session, which is a (network, sessIdent) pair
implementing the link. The P4 function attaches sessIdent =
PCd4e1 to the packet as metadata, and next applies Send for
p2 in the service network.
In Step 2, p2 sends the packet in session PCd4e1. The key
in the Send table is the sessIdent, and the action is an encod-
ing of the session’s header. The program encapsulates the
packet in this header, adds the metadata inLink = Self to the
packet, and applies Forward for p2 in the service network.
Step 3 applies the Forward table, with keys inLink and
header fields. The result of a match is either the action Drop
or an outLink on which the packet should be transmitted. The
outLink is 5, and next (Step 4) the Transmit table is applied
with this key. Step 4 in the service network is analogous to
Step 1 in the customer network. Currently links in the ser-
vice network are simulated as physical (Primitive), and the
packet is sent out the machine’s egress port 5.
In Step 5, as the packet is received on the other end of
the link, it gets the metadata inLink = 3. The keys into the
Acquire table are the inLink and the packet header, which is
matched against header predicates in the table. The possible
actions in the table are Receive and Forward. Because p3
is not the destination of the packet, the next step will be to
apply the Forward table. Steps 6, 7, and 8 of the example are
similar to Steps 3, 4, and 5.
In Step 8 the Acquire table says the packet will be re-
ceived, and in Step 9 the key in the Receive table is the
session identifier in the packet header. The action in the ta-
ble might be Primitive, meaning that this session is being
used by its machine for the machines’s own purposes, so the
packet should simply be delivered to the operating system. In
this case the action is an external link, which is a (network,
linkIdent) pair. This means that the session is implement-
ing the identified virtual link in the external network, so the
next step is to apply the Acquire table for e in the customer
network, after stripping off its service-network header.
With these five functions and suitable match-action tables,
any set of composed networks, no matter how complex their
layering relationships, can be implemented. The P4 func-
tions for a particular network depend chiefly on its header
format, so for known network types, most of the P4 code for
a set of composed networks can be generated automatically.
At the same time, with knowledge of a specific network,
it is easy to make optimizations (which can be factored into
code generation). For example, we know that in this example
all customer links are implemented by sessions in the service
network (as opposed to being physical links), and all ser-
vice links are simulated physical links. With this simplifying
knowledge alone, a packet can be processed and forwarded
at a machine, through two layered networks, in a total of
4 match-action stages. In an unoptimized program, there
would be 8 stages. On the Barefoot Tofino, our optimized
prototype consumes about 3% of the compute resources, e.g.,
ALUs, metadata, action buses, and gateways.
The P4 functions for a network can have additional code
for network management, and this code is easy to place. In
the service network, e.g., code for monitoring the perfor-
mance of a customer link would be plugged into Send and
Receive for the service session implementing the link.
5.2 Integrated network development
We have shown that each network is a module with its
own separate set of match-action tables and its own parti-
tion of the total set of properties to be proved. We have also
shown that properties of different networks often take a sim-
ilar form. This means that cumulative experience will make
it much easier to identify the goals, constraints, and prop-
erties of specialized networks. This is especially important
for security goals, because it is the modeling gaps that are
exploited by adversaries.
The purpose of our formal semantics is to translate match-
action tables into network-wide behavioral properties. So the
formal semantics enables us to look at a network’s tables and
say, e.g., “all paths to destination d pass through a firewall”
or “consist of secure links.”
For small, static networks we can use the Alloy Analyzer
to check or generate match-action tables. For real networks,
in which tables are large and dynamic, there must be control
functions to generate and update them. For our prototype
we plan to experiment with a centralized controller. With a
specification of network topology and properties, it may even
be possible to generate controller code that is verified cor-
rect, so that the tables it produces need not be verified. This
is already conceivable with tools such as Rosette [17], and
the modularity of networks may make it feasible. Without
network properties introduced as design principles, not only
would controller generation be impossible, but the properties
necessary for data-plane verification would be missing.
6. RELATED WORK
Research on “future Internet architectures” has produced
plans for a number of clean-slate architectures, e.g., [1, 19,
20, 23]. Each has its own special emphasis—so it is doubtful
that any one of them could meet all of the Internet’s future
needs, and they are not compatible enough to merge into one
unified design. Compositional network architecture is not
a clean-slate approach, but rather a structured and modular
way of describing networks as they already are. It easily
covers special-purpose networks such as Named Data Net-
works [23], showing how they can be composed with other
networks in a flexible architecture.
The remaining related work concerns network verification.
Tools for verification of routing and forwarding, e.g., [9, 10,
11, 14], were mentioned in §4.1. These tools have the ad-
vantage of applying to existing networks. They are equally
applicable to networks with our architecture, however, and
modularity should make them even more scalable. The Tiros
verification tool [2] already benefits from incorporating some
customer-level abstractions, albeit without the unifying com-
positional model.
There has been much recent research activity on automated
verification of P4 programs, such as ASSERT-P4 [5], the p4v
tool [13], and Vera [18]. Generally speaking, these verifica-
tion efforts focus on low-level, service-independent proper-
ties of P4 programs, e.g., is a referenced header field valid?
Are array accesses in bounds? Are there recirculation loops?
These should be very useful for making our P4 code robust.
Not surprisingly, the most significant issue for these ver-
ifiers is how to check higher-level, network-wide properties
without knowing the match-action tables that will be driv-
ing the programs. Sample tables can be given to a verifier,
although this makes analysis a hybrid of verification and test-
ing. ASSERT-P4 and Vera are both based on symbolic ex-
ecution, and use symbolic (partial) representations of table
contents. The p4v tool, on the other hand, comes with a lan-
guage for specifying the properties of match-action tables,
so that verification can rely on these properties if they are
known. This is the best solution, but useless without the table
properties. The value of our approach is that the properties
of tables will be readily available, as well as the specification
of network-wide requirements.
7. RESEARCH PLANS
Due to the breadth and novelty of our approach, our cur-
rent work is exploratory in nature. Completing the prototype
will answer remaining feasibility questions, including: (i)
How much changes when networks are dynamic rather than
static? (ii) How do we incorporate session protocols, espe-
cially those that may require non-P4 custom code to perform
encryption and decryption? Then, we can proceed to fur-
ther research projects, with evaluation, to answer more inter-
esting questions such as these: (iii) Will easily-automated
optimizations be sufficient to produce acceptably efficient
P4 code? (iv) How much of the service design space can
be covered by model-based development? (v) How much
code generation and automated verification can actually be
achieved? (vi) Can we evaluate architectural trade-offs in
two dimensions—both for implementation efficiency and for
effectiveness of specification and verification?
Inevitably, there will always be a need for custom code,
in both control and data planes. One promising approach to
making it trustworthy is the development of verifiable pro-
gramming languages such as Dafny, which is general enough
for systems programming yet restricted enough for automated
verification [6, 12]. Another promising approach is the de-
velopment of reusable, customizable, and verified middle-
boxes, for example on the Vigor platform [21], greatly re-
ducing the need for writing unverified code. Even middle-
boxes benefit from layering, because their functions within
separate networks can become separate modules.
In summary, this paper presents a constructive approach
toward verifiable network services. Of course it will not be
sufficient, but there is ample evidence to show that it is at
least a necessary step forward. It also has the potential to
coalesce and magnify the benefits of many other research
projects on network programming, verification, and security.
Although it may seem improbable, it is better than the im-
possible of continuing forever to connect the world with un-
trustworthy network services, or the impossible of working
bottom-up from unprincipled to principled networks.
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